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held, on these facts, there was no completed sale of the property, no title
passed to the defendant, and lie was not
liable for the price. Whether he was
liable, as bailee, for failure to return
according to his contract, was not determined.
The contract, therefore, in Elphick v.
Barnes, being at its inception only a
bailment and not a present sale, the
question simply is, how far a bailee is
excused from his implied or even express
obligation to return the property bailed
in as good condition, by the death or
unavoidable destruction of the property,
without his fault.
And if a contract to sell and deliver
at a future day is excused, by the death
or loss of the property before that day,
without the owner's fault, as has been
frequently held (see Dexter v. Norton,
47 N. Y. 62), it would seem very clear
that such an excuse would be sufficient
to exonerate a mere bailee, custodian,
&c., from returning property held under
such a 2ontract.
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Accordingly it was long since decided
that a borrower of a horse was not liable for not returning him, if he died in
his possession, without his fault: IV7liams v. Lloyd, W. Jon. 179 ; s. c.
Williams v. Hide, Palm. 548; Youngv.
Braces, 5 Litt. 324 ; Harrisv. Nicholas,
5 Mfunf. 483.
On the same principle, where a plaintiff in replevin had been ordered to return the animal replevied, and the animal died without his fault, before any
suit was commenced on the bond to return it, this was held a good defence:
Carpenter v. Stevens, 12 Wend. 589.
Of course, in such a contract as in
Elphick v. Barnes, if the buyer during
the time allowed for a return of the property, so misuses the property as materially to impair its value, that disables
him from returning it, and makes the
sale absolute and renders him liable for
the price, even though lie attempted to
return it, but without acceptance of
the vendor: Ray v. Thompson, 12 Cush.
281.
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Supreme Court of the United States.
THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY v. JOSEPH E. ROY.
A carrier of passengers, for hire, is bound to observe the utmost caution charaoteristic of very careful, prudent men.
He is responsible for injuries received by passengers, in the course of their transportation, which might have been avoided or guarded against by the exercise, upon
his part, of extraordinary vigilance, aided by the highest skill.
Such caution and diligence extends to all the appliances and means used by the
carrier in the transportation of the passenger.
He must provide cars or vehicles adequate, that is, sufficiently secure as to strength
and other requisites, for the safe conveyance of passengers ; and for the slightest
negligence or fault in that regard, from which injury results to the "passenger, the
carrier is liable in damages.
A passenger purchased from a railroad company a ticket over its line, and at the
same time, from the Pullman Palace Car Company, a ticket entitling him to a berth
in one of its sleeping-cars, constituting a part of the train of the railroad company.
In the course of transportation he was iniured by the falling of a berth in the

246

PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY v. ROY.

sleeping-car, in which he was at the time riding. Held, that for the purposes of the
contract with the railroad company for transportation, and in view of its obligation
to use only cars that were adequate for safe conveyance, the sleeping-car company,
railroad
its conductor and porter, were, in law, the servants and employees of the
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cerned, that the jury based their verdict upon legal evidence only.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Illinois.

Defendant in error recovered a verdict and judgment for $10,000
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for personal injuries received while riding, as a passenger,
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The facts set forth in the bill of exceptions, so far as material,
were these: On the 5th of June 1876 the defendant in error, purchased at the office of the lessee company, in the city of Chicago,
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engaged the upper berth of the section, in which they were sitting,
fell. Thereupon the porter of the sleeping-car came at once and
put up the berth, saying it would not fall again. Shortly thereafter the berth fell a second time, striking the plaintiff upon the
head, injuring his brain, incapacitating him from the performance
of his usual avocations, and necessitating medical treatment.
-After the second falling of the berth, the brace or arm supporting it was found to be broken.
The evidence introduced by the plaintiff tended also to show
that the Pennsylvania Company provided cars in which passengers,
having railroad tickets, could ride without purchasing a: sleepingcar ticket; that Roy had much experience in travelling, and would
hav gone into one of those cars had he not purchased a sleepiigcar ticket; that at the time he purchased the sleeping-car ticket he
did not know what company ran the sleepers, but upon taking the
train he ascertained it was a Pullman car; that the Pullman
Palace Car Company was engaged in furnishing cars to be run in
the trains of railroad companies; that, besides the general conductor of the train, there was a conductor, in uniform, and a
porter, whose duty it was to make up the berths and attend to the
wants ot passengers occupying the sleeping-car.
Upon the trial the plaintiff introduced a time and distance card
of the defendant corporation, issued, published and circulated by
that company during 'the year 1876, prior to the date of his
injuries. That card, referring to the 'Fort Wayne and Pennsylvania Railroad line," stated that three e±press trains left Chicago
daily, one "with popularvestibule sleeping-ear," one "with drawing-room and hotel-car," and one "with 'drawing-room sleepingcar" It gave notice, that "passage, excursion and sleeping-car
tickets" could be purchased at the defendant compan'y"s office in
Chicago. Referring to the "Fort Wayne and Pennsylvania line,",
the same card announced that "no road offers equal facilities in
the number of through trains, equzppeid wit/z :llman ?alace
sleeping-cars." It stated, aring the advantages of the I Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Pennsylvania, *through line," that the
latter was the "only line running three through-trains, with Pull..
man palace cars," and "the only line running sleeping-carifromChicago and intermediate-stations fo 'iiad'elphia without change."'
The same card gave" the rates charged' for berths andI seciions in
Pullimnii sleeping-cars from Chicago to points east of'thiat city.
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The defendant, to maintain the issues on its part, offered to
prove,
1. That the sleeping-car in which the accident occurred, and all
the sleeping-cars then and theretofore on the defendant's line,
since the 27th January 1870, were owned by the Pullman Palace
Car Company, a corporation of the state of Illinois, and not by
the defendant; that said sleeping-cars were run in the same trains
with the defendant's cars; that holders of railroad tickets were
entitled to ride in said sleeping-cars, provided they also held
sleeping-car tickets.
2. That the Pullman Palace Car Company, and it only, issued
tickets for sale, entitling passengers to ride in said sleeping-cars;
that such tickets were plainly distinguishable from railroad tickets,
and were sold at offices established by said company, and indicated
as places for the sale of such tickets; that the plaintiff purchased
the sleeping-car ticket of the same person of whom he bought the
railroad ticket; that the office where purchased indicated by plain
lettering upon its door that it was a place for the sale of PullmanPalace Car Company tickets, as well-as railroad tickets.
3. That the Pullman Palace Car Company employed persons to
take charge of its cars, and whilst in use they were in the immediate charge of a conductor and a porter employed by that
company; that such conductor and porter were the only persons
who had authority to manage and control the interior of said cars,
and the berths and seats and the appurtenances thereto.
To this proof the plaintiff objected, and the objection was
sustained, to which ruling the company excepted.
The court thereupon charged the jury, that the proof tended
"to show that the injurywas received by reason of the negligence
of the defendant's agents or servants, or by some negligence in
the construction of the car in which the plaintiff was riding." To
that charge the company at the time excepted, upon the ground
that it was unsupported by the testimony, and because it assumed
as a fact that the persons in charge of the sleeping-car were the
company's- agents or servants.
The court further charged the jury that "the defendant has
offered in your presence to prove that the car in which the plaintiff
was injured was not the car or the actual-property of the defendant,
but was the property of another corporation. But I instruct, as apart of the law of this case, that if this car- composed a part of the
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train in which the plaintiff and other passengers were to be transported upon their journey, and the plaintiff was injured while in
that car, without any fault of his own, and by reason either of the
defective construction of the car or by some negligence on the part
of those having charge of the car, then the defendant is liable."
To that charge also the defendant excepted.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, J.-We are of opinion that there was no substantial

error, either in excluding the evidence offered by the defendant or
in the charge to the jury. The court only applied to a new state
of facts, principles very generally recognised as fundamental, in
the law of passenger carriers. Those thus engaged are under an
obligation, arising out of the nature of their employment, and on
grounds of public policy, vigorously enforced, to provide for the
safety of passengers whom they have assumed, for hire, to carry
from one place to another. In Piladelphiaand Reading Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 486, it was said, that when carriers
undertake to convey persons by the powerful and dangerous agency
of steam, public policy and safety require that they be held to the
greatest possible care and diligence-that the personal safety of
passengers should not be left to the sport of chance or the negligence of careless agents. This doctrine was expressly affirmed in
Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 474. In Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 191, affirming the decision of Chief Justice
TANEY on the circuit, we said, that although the carrier does not
warrant the safety of the passengers at all events, yet his undertaking and liability as to them go to the extent, that he or his agents,
where he acts by agents, shall possess competent skill and, as far
as human care and foresight can go, he will transport them safely.
The principles there announced were approved in Railroad Co. v
Pollard,22 Wall. 850, where, speaking by the present chief justice, we said, that we saw no necessity for reconsidering Stokes v.
Saltonstall.
These and many other adjudged cases, cited with approval in
elementary treatises of acknowledged authority, show that the
carrier is required, as to passengers, to observe the utmost caution,
characteristic of very careful, prudent men. He is responsible for
injuries received by passengers, in the course of their transportation, which might have been avoided or guarded against by the
VoL. XXIX.-32
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exercise, upon his part, of extraordinary vigilance, aided by the
highest skill. And this caution and vigilance must, necessarily,
be extended to all the agencies or means employed by the carrier,
in the transportation of the passenger. Among the duties resting
upon him is the important one of providing cars or vehicles adequate, that is, sufficiently secure as to strength and other requisites,
for the safe conveyance of passengers. That duty the law enforces
with great strictness. For the slightest negligence or fault in this
regard, from which injury results to the passenger, the carrier is
liable in damages. These doctrines, to which the courts, with few
exceptions, have given a firm and steady support, and which it is
neither wise nor just to disturb nor question, would, however, lose
much, if not all, of their practical value, if carriers are permitted
to escape responsibility upon the ground, that the cars or vehicles
used by them, and from whose insufficiency injury has resulted to
the passenger, belong to others.
The undertaking of the railroad company was to carry the defendant in error over its line, in consideration of a certain sum,
if he elected to ride in what is known as a first-class passenger
car; with the privilege, nevertheless, expressly given in its published notices, of riding in a sleeping-car, constituting a part of
the carrier'8 train, for an additional sum paid to the company
owning such car.
As between the parties now before us, it is not material that the
sleeping-car in question was owned by the Pullman Palace Car
3ompany, or that such company provided, at its own expense, a
conductor and porter for such car, to whom was committed the
immediate control of its interior arrangements. The duty of the
railroad company was to convey the passenger over its line. In
performing that duty, it could not, consistently with the law and
the obligations arising out of the nature of its business, use cars or
vehicles whose inadequacy or insufficiency for safe conveyance was
discoverable upon the most careful and thorough examination. If
it chose to make no such examination, or cause it to be made, if it
elected to reserve or exercise no such control or right of inspection, from time to time, of the sleeping-cars which it used in conveying passengers, as it should exercise over its own cars, it was
chargeable with negligence or failure of duty. The law will conclusively presume that the conductor and porter, assigned by the
Pullman Palace Car Company to the control of the interior
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arrangements of the sleeping-car in which Roy was riding when
injured, exercised such control with the assent of the railroad company. For the purposes of the contract under which the railroad
company undertook to carry Roy over its line, and, in view of its
obligation to use only cars that were adequate for safe conveyance,
the sleeping-car company, its conductor and porter were, in law,
the servants and employees of the railroad company. Their negligence, or the negligence of either of them, as to any matters
involving the safety or security of passengers, while being conveyed, was the negligence of the railroad company. The law will
not permit a railroad company, engaged in the business of carrying persons, for hire, through any device or arrangement with a
sleeping-car company, whose cars are used by, and constitute a
part of the train of, the railroad company, to throw off the duty
of providing proper means for the safe conveyance of those whom
it has agreed to convey: 2 Kent's Com. 600, 12th ed; 2 Parsons
on Contr. 218-19, 6th ed. ; Story on Bailments, sects. 601, 601a,
602 ; Cooley on Torts 642 ; Wharton's Negligence, 2d ed., sect. 627,
et seq. : Chitty on Carriers, s. P. 256 et seq., and cases cited by the
authors.
It is also an immaterial circumstance that Roy, when injured,
was not sitting in the particular sleeping-car to which he had been
originally assigned. His right, for a time, to occupy a seat in the
car in which his friend was riding, was not, and, under the facts
disclosed, could not be questioned. ,
Whether the Pullman Palace Car Company is not, also, and
equally, liable to the defendant in error, or whether it may not be
liable over to the railroad company for any damages which the latter may be required to pay on account of the injury complained
of, are questions which need not be here considered. That corporation was dismissed from the case, and it is not necessary or
proper that we should now determine any question between it and
others.
. 2. Upon the trial below the plaintiff was allowed, against the
objection of defendant, to make proof as to his financial condition,
and to show that, after being injured, his sources of income were
very limited.
This evidence was, obviously, irrelevant. The plaintiff, in view
of the pleadings and evidence, was entitled to compensation, and
nothing more, for such damages as he had sustained in consequence
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of injuries received. But the damages were not, in law, dependent, in the slightest degree, upon his condition as to wealth or
poverty. It is manifest, however, from the record, that the
learned judge who presided at the trial, subsequently recognised
the error committed in the admission of that testimony. After
charging the jury that the measure of plaintiff's damages was the
pecuniary loss sustained by him in consequence of the injuries
received, and after stating the rules by which such loss should be
ascertained, the court proceeded: "But the jury should not take
into consideration any evidence touching the plaintiff's pecuniary
condition at the time he received the injury, because it is wholly
immaterial how much a man may have accumulated up to the time
he is injured; the real question being how much his ability to earn
money in the future has been impaired."
Notwithstanding this emphatic direction that the jury should
exclude from consideration any evidence in relation to the pecuniary condition of the plaintiff, the contention of the defendant is,
that the original error was not thereby cured, and that we should
assume that the jury, disregarding the court's peremptory instructions, made the poverty of the plaintiff an element in the assessment of damages. And this, although the record discloses nothing
justifying the conclusion that the jury disobeyed the direction of
the court. To this position we cannot assent, although we are
referred- to some adjudged cases which seem to announce the
broad proposition that, an error in the admission of evidence cannot afterwards be corrected by instructions to the jury, so as to
cancel the exception taken to its admission. But such a rule
would be exceedingly inconvenient in practice, and would often
seriously obstruct the course of business in the courts. It cannot
be sustained upon principle, or by sound reason, and is against the
great weight of authority. The charge from the court that the
jury should not consider evidence, which had been improperly
admitted, was equivalent to striking it out of the case. The exception to its admission fell when the error was subsequently corrected by instructions too clear and positive to be misunderstood
by the jury. The presumption should not be indulged that the
jury were too ignorant to comprehend, or were too unmindful of
their duty to respect, instructions as to matters peculiarly within
the province of the cou'rt to determine. It should rather be, so
far as this court is concerned, that the jury were influenced in
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their verdict only by legal evidence. Any other rule would make
it necessary in every trial, where an error in the admission of
proof is committed, of which error the court becomes aware before
the final submission of the case to the jury, to suspend the trial,
discharge the jury, and commence anew. A rule of practice leading to such results cannot meet with approval.
3. There was, however, an error committed upon the trial, to
which exception was duly taken, but which does not seem to
have been .remedied by any portion of the charge appearing in the
bill of exceptions. The plaintiff was permitted, against the objection of the defendant, to give the number and ages of his children-a son, ten years of age, and three daughters of the ages,
respectively, of fourteen, seventeen and twenty-one. This evidence does not appear to have been withdrawn from the consideration of the jury.- It certainly had no legitimate bearing upon any
issue in the case. The manifest object of its introduction was to
inform the jury that the plaintiff had infant children dependent
upon him fbr support, and, consequently, that his injuries involved
the comfort of his family. This proof, in connection with the
impairment of his ability to earn money, was well calculated to
arouse the sympathies of the jury, and to enhance the damages
beyond the amount which the law permitted, that is, beyond what
was, under all the circumstances, fair and just compensation to the
person suing for the injuries received by him. How far the assessment of damages was controlled by this evidence as to the plaintiff's family it is impossible to determine with absolute certainty;
but the reasonable presumption is, that it had some influence upon
the verdict.
The court, in.a manner well calculated to attract the attention
of the jury, withdrew from their consideration the evidence touching the financial condition of the plaintiff, but as nothing was said
by it concerning the evidence as to the ages of his children, they
had the right to infer that the proof as to those matters was
not withdrawn and should not be ignored in the assessment of
damages.
For this error alone the judgment is reversed, and the cause
remanded for a new trial.
The decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the above case is
important, for two reasons, viz. : 1. As
showing that while some of the state

cou ts are inclined to relax the obliga.
tions of the common carrier of goods
and the carrier of passengers, whenever
an opportunity presents itself for so
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doing, the supreme federal court adheres to the rule which, established on
grounds of public policy, it has, on
all occasions, maintained.
2. As applying the rules of law to new circunstances. We believe the exact question
determined in this case-the liability of
a railroad company for an i yury received in a Pullman car-has not been
determined in any previously reported
case in an appellate court.
But as we have said, the principles
upn which the decision is based are not
new, and we, thereffre, propose in this
note to review the cases, both English
and American, in which they are to be
found, and to state the rule, which may
properly be drawn therefrom. Confining our discussion to the liability of passenger carriers, we shall only incidentally, and that in but one relation, deal
with common carriers of goods.
An instructive case on this point is
John v. Bacon, Law Rep., 5 C. P. 437.
A carrier by water, for the purpose of
embarking his passengers, used a hulk
belonging to another person. A passenger, while waiting on the hulk for the
boat, fell through a hatchway which had
been negligently left open.
All the
judges of the Court of Common Pleas
agreed that the carrier was liable. " I
think there was, by the issuing of a
ticket," said BOVIL, C. J., "a contract
with the plaintiff to carry him safely,
* * * and that, therefore, independently
of any occupation of the hulk, the defendant was responsible for an injury
resulting from want of care."
"I also
agree," said KEATING, .., " with what
my Lord has said, with respect to the
defendant's contract to carry the plaintiff. It was clearly during the course
of the transit that the accident occurred,
through the negligence either of the delenuant's servant or those of the owners
of the hulk, and under the authowity
of Great lVestern Railroad Co. v. Blake,
. Hurlst. & N. 987, it does not matter
which."

MONTAGUE SMITH, J., coil-

curred, and BRETT, J., added: "I do
not feel at ill satisfied that the control
of tile
detbumlant over the hulk was such
as in itself to render him responsible for
the acts of the owners of the hulk or
their servants, lie hind no such control,
it seems to me, as would make him liable for their acts, as a master is liable
for the negligent acts of his servants. I
doubt vhether any invitation, which dots
not amount to a contract or to a false
and fraudulent misrepresentation, can
be the foundation of a legal liability.
If tile
contract of carriage in this case
did not cover the hulk, I should very
much doubt whether the detndant was
liable. I feel perfectly clear, however,
that the contract of the defendant was
to carry the plaintiff from the shore at
Milford Haven to Liverpool, and that
the hulk, therefore, was part of the
means of transport, and that it was the
improper state of this,
the result of negligence, which caused the accident, and
if so, I think the defendant was responsible, whether its state was caused by
the negligence of his own servants or
of other persons. It seems to me that
Great estern Railroad Co. v. Blake,
as I gather the reasons of the decision
from the judgment of the Lord Chief
Justice and my brother BYLES, is an authority fbr that ; and I think it has been
authoritatively explained as laying down
that principle in Buxton v. North Eastern Railroad Co., Law Rep., 3 Q. B.
549, which is also an authority for the
decision at which we have arrived in
this case." So, a carrier is liable for
an injury sustained by a passenger by
slipping on ice carelessly left on the
depot platform, although the depot is
owned or controlled by a third party
(Seyrmour v. Chicago Railroad Co., 3
Biss. 43) ; and the owner of a stagecoach is responsible for the negligence
of the proprietors of a ferry over which
the stage-coach is obliged to pass : M1eLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277.
Great 11estern Railroad Co. v. Blake
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7 H. & N. 987, referred to above, clearly
settled this important principle in England, at least, viz. : that where a railioad cz-mpany contracts with a passenger to carry him from one place to
another, and on the journey, the train
has to pass over the road of another
company, the company issuing the ticket
incurs the same responsibility for an accident arising on that other line as it
would on its own; and this although
the contracting company had no control
over the road in fault and was not responsible, otherwise, for its management. In Blake's Case, B. purchased
a ticket at the depot of the G. company
from P. to M. The line of the G. company extended from P. to G. ; from G.
to M. the road belonged to the S. company. B. travelled from P. to G. in
safety, but between G. and Al. was injured by a collision caused by the negligence of the servants of the S. company,
but without the fault of the driver of the
train or any of the servants of the G.
company. A judgment against the G.
company was affirmed in the Exchequer
Chamber. Subsequently, in the Queen's
Bench, it appeared that B. was a passenger by the defendant's railroad, to be
carried from S. to T. To reach S. it
was necessary to travel over a line belonging to another company; while
passing over the latter line, the train
on which B. was came into collision with
a bullock, which had strayed on to the
line from an adjoining field, by breaking through the fence. On the authority of Blake's*Case, the defendant was
held to be the proper party to sue. So
where T. bought a ticket of the defendant company to be carried from A.
through B. to C., and it appeared that
at B. the defendant's line joined the line
of another company, over which the defendant had a right by statute to run to
C., and between B. and C., T. was injured, no negligence being attributable
to the servants of the defendant, it was
nevertheless decided that the defendant

company was liable: -Thwmas v. Rlymney Railroad Co., Law Rep., 5 Q. B.
226; Law Rep., 6 Q. B. 226.
MIachu v. London and Southwestern
Railroad Co., 2 Ex. 415, arose under
the English Carriers' Act, which exempts a carrier from liability as an insurer for silk goods, &c., but provides:
that "nothing in this act shall be deemed
to protect any mail contractor, stagecoach proprietor or other common carrier
for hire, from liability to answer for loss
or injury to any goods or articles whatsoever, arising from the felonious acts of
any coachman, guard, book-keeper, porter or other servant in their employ."
The plaintiff delivered to the defendant
company a bale of silk for carriage.
The bale was placed in a van under the
charge of one Johnson, a porter in the
employ of Chaplin & Home, a firm employed by the defendant to carry goods
for them. The silk was stolen by Johnson. On the trial it was contended that
Johnson was not a servant of the defendants and in their employ within the
meaning of those words in the statute.
But the Lord Chief Baron directed a
verdict for the plaintiff and his direction
was affirmed by the Court of Exchequer.
"This statute," said PLATT, B., "when
considered with attention, can be very
plainly expounded, and ought to be construed with reference to the duty of
carriers, according to the custom of the
realm. Without *this statute a carrier
would be liable for the safety of the
goods until their arrival at their place
of destination. * * * Any person employed by a carrier to perform the contract into which he enters, is a servant
in the employ of the carrier within the
true meaning of this statute. Any
other construction would be the parent
of very dangerous consequences. These
companies might let out every single
part of their carriers' business, which is
generally very extensive, to others, who
might employ other servants under them.
If we were to hold that such servants
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are not the servants of the company, a
complete immunity would be obtained
from the responsibility for every single
theft that might be committed from one
end of their line to the other, under the
pretext that the persons by whom the
theft had been committed were not their
servants or in their employ. It would be
an exceedingly dangerous doctrine to
hold, that these persons, who employ all
the protits derived from the carriage of
the goods, shall by a sub-contract unknown to tle other party, get rid of
their responsibility."
Thorpe v. Xew Tork- Central, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 13 Hun 70; s.c. 76 N. Y.
402, decided in New York in 1879,
though not referred to by Mr. Justice
HARLAN, in his opinion in the principal
case, will probably remain the leading
adjudication on this phase of the law
of the drawing-room and sleeping car.
The New York Central Railroad Company had a contract with Wagner, by
which Wagner agreed to place upon its
road certain drawing-room cars of his
make and bearing his name. The terms
of the contract were such it is presumed
as are usual in such cases, in agreements
between railroad companies and sleeping
or palace car companies. Wagner agreed
at his own cost to place upon the defendant's road as many drawing-room cars
as should be required for the accommodation of the defendant's traffic, to
keep the cars in good* repair, to provide
conductors and porters, who were to
have charge of the distribution of comparu.nents and seats therein without interference from the conductors of the
tra as. The latter were to be allowed
at x1ltimes to enter the cars for the
purpose of collecting fares of passengers,
or for any purpose connected with the
management of the train, and the porters
and conductors of the drawing-room cars
were to assist the conductors of the
regular trains, whenever called upon, in
maintaining order and discipline on the
train. Wagner was to account monthly

to the road as to the receipts and earnings, and was to pay the defendant
twenty per cent. of the gross earnings,
after deducting license fees paid for any
patented inventions used in the cars,
which payment was in consideration of
the service performed by the defendant
in hauling the cars, furnishing fuel and
lights therefor, and repairing the trucks,
brakes and exterior of the cars. The
defendant reserved the right to determine
the location of the drawing-room cars in
its trains. The question in the case was
the liability of the defendant for the
wrongful ejection of a passenger from
the drawing-room car by the porter of
that car. In the Supreme Court the
answer was in the affirmative. Said
BOARDMAN, J. : " If the porter had been
defendant's servant, no reasonable doubt
could exist as to its liability under the
facts proved. It may well be that Wagner is liable; of that we need not now
consider. The legislature of this state
has given to the defendant certain franchises. It cannot divest itself of its responsibility under the laws for the proper
exercise of its duties. The arrangement
between the defendant and Wagner was
private and personal. When Wagner's
car was put into the train, it became a
part of defendant's train, was under the
control of its conductor, was in his care
and custody. The defendant and not
Wagner ran the train. In effect Wagner, by his agreement, supplied the
defendant with certain cars to be used
for the joint interest of Wagner and
defendant. The Wagner cars were run
for joint account. Why, then, are not
Wagner's servants in these drawingroom cars also the servants of the defendant ? Why shall not the defendant
be held responsible for the wrongful act
of Wagner, or his agent, while upon its
road and under its control ? * * * We

are led to the conclusion that the defendant was liable for the acts of the porter
of the Wagner car, to the same extent
as if he had been hired by, and was in
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me immediate employment of the defendant.' One judge dissented. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals this ruling was
unanimously affirmed. ANDREWS, J.,
in delivering the opinion of the court,
stated the reasons for the rule adopted
with admirable clearness: "The business of running drawing-room cars, in
connection with ordinary passenger cars,
has become one of the common incidents
of passenger traffic on the leading railroads of the country. These cars are
mingled with the other cars of the company, and are open to all who desire to
enter them, and who are willing to pay
a sum in addition to the ordinary fare,
for the special accommodation afforded
by them. They are put on presumably
in the interest of the road. They form
a part of the train, and the manner of
conducting the business is an invitation
to the public to use them, upon the condition of paying the extra compensation
charged. Passengers cannot know what
private or special arrangement, if any,
exists between the company and third
persons under which this part of the
business is conducted, and they have, we
think, in taking one of these cars, a
right to assume that they are there under
a contract with the company, and that
the servants in charge of the drawingroom cars are its servants. Otherwise
there would be two separate contracts in
the case of each passenger in these cars,
one with the company and one with
Wagner. Such a condition of things
would involve a confusion of rights and
obligations, and divide a responsibility
which ought to be single and definite.
Take the case of a passengerin a drawingroom car, who should be burned by the negligent upsetting or breaking of a lamp by
the porter, or the case of a passenger in a
sleeping car injured by the porter's negligence. Is the passenger, in these or
other similar cases which may be supposed, to be turned over, for his remedy,
against Wagner, on the ground that the
servant who caused the injury was his
VOL. XXIX.- 33
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servant and not the defenaant's. The
public interest and due protection to the
rights of passengers require that the railroad company, which is exercising the
franchise of operating the road for the
carriage of passengers, should be charged
with and responsible for the management
of the train, and that all persons employed thereon should, -ts to passengers,
be deemed to be the servants of the corporation." The passage italicized in the
above extract suggests an injury similar
to that received in the principal case.
In a very recent Massachusetts case, the
plaintiff took passage on the defendant's
railroad, and also purchased a ticket
entitling him to ride in a sleeping car
forming part of the train. While en
route he left the car at a depot to take
dinner, leaving his baggage in the car,
on the assurance of an employee that it
would be safe there. On his return tq
the car he found that his baggage had
been.transferred to another sleeping car
in the train, and that one article was
missing. In an action for the loss the
defendant offered to prove that the sleeping car did not belong to it, but to
another company which managed and
controlled it, and that it was in the care
and charge of the employees of the
owners, under a contract with the defendant under which the owners were to
furnish the sleeping cars and conductors,
and servants to take charge of them, and
collect the fares for the sleeping accommodations ; on these facts the defendant
contended that it was not liable. Tie
trial judge thought otherwise and directed
judgment for the plaintiff, which ruling
was affirmed on appeal. "The plaintiff's contract of transportation," said
GRAY, C. J., "was with the defendant
alone. The fact that the car was not
owned by the defendant, but was used
on the road under a contract with other
parties, who furnished conductors and
servants to take charge of such car,
there being no evidence that the plair,
tiff knew of that contract, or bad anj
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important victory in one of the federal
notice that the car was not owned by the Circuit Courts, in the well known case
defendant, and under its exclusive con- of Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Ex. Co.,
trol, coull not affect the measure of the
Lawson on Carriers 436. The receipt
defendant's liability to the plaintiff:"
of an express company for two packages
Kinsley v. Lake Shore, 'c., Railroad of money released it from liability for
Co., 125 Mass. 54.
any loss or damage occasioned by fire, i. e.
The rule as to the responsibility of a accidental fire. The money was carried
carrier for the agencies employed by him by rail in an iron safe, under the care of
in the conduct of his business, is applied a messenger of the express company.
with great strictness to the case of a While in transit the train was thrown
common carrier of goods. Of late years from the track, the express car took fire
there has grown up in the carrying trade and the packages were destroyed. On
an extensive and important auxiliary the trial in the United States Circuit
whose functions now supply a public Court for the District of Kentucky,
necessity which the railroad and the BALLARD, J., instructed the jury as folsteamboat do not attempt, viz : the per- lows: "If you believe that the package
sonal delivery of property of small bulk, was destroyed by fire as above indicated
called express, forwarding or dispatch without any fault or neglect on behalf
companies, as the case may be ; these of the messenger of the defendant, the
important public servants were early defendant has brought itself within the
held by the court to all the duties and terms of the exception, and it is not
liabilities of the carrier at common law. liable. It is not material to inquire
Stadhecker v. Combs, 9 Rich. 193;
whether the accident resulted from the
Buck-land v. Adams Ex. Co., 97 Mass.
uant of care or from the negligence of
124; Southern Ex.Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
635; Read v. Spaulding, 5 Bosw. 395;
and its agents or not, since the unconCaristenson v. American Ex. Co., 15 troverted testimony shows that the car
Minn. 270; Sherman v. 1Vells, 28 Barb. and train in which the messenger of the
403; Baldwin v. American Ex. Co., 23 Adams Express Company was transI1. 197 ; Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Penn. porting the package belonged to the
St. 308; Sweet v. Barney, 23 N. Y. _ Louisville and Nashville Railroad Coin335. But because in nearly every in-_ pany, and were exclusively subject to
stance they neither owned nor were in- its control and orders. A common carI
tended to own, nor could possibly contra
rier who has not limited his responsibility
the agents which they were obliged t(
t is undoubtedly responsible for losses,
employ, because an expressman did non whether occurring on vehicles controlled
own the railroads or the steamboat upos s by him exclusively or belonging to and
which the goods were transported, it we .t controlled by others; because he is an
argued with some degree of force thi e insurer for the safe delivery of the artithey could not be responsible for thts cle .which he has agreed to carry; but
defaults or the negligence of such agen or when he has limited his liability so as to
as they could neither direct nor watch ncae make himself responsible for ordinary
control. This argument prevailed to sornrt care only, and the shipper to recover
extent in an inferior New York con ut against him is obliged to aver and prove
(Hersfield v. Adams, 19 Barb. 577), b
ce negligence, it must be his negligence or
only to be soon afterwards denied: Plaad the negligence of his agents, and not the
v "Union Express Co., 2 Hilt. 19 ; Re4q. negligence of persons over whom he has
v Spaulding, 5 Bosw. 395; s. c. 30 1b. no control. If in his employment he
Y. 630; Russell v. Livingston, 19 Bar re uses the vehicles of others, over which he
546 Later, however, it obtained a me
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has no control, and uses reasonable care,
that is, such care as ordinarily prudent
persons engaged in like business use in
selecting the vehicles, and if the loss
arises from a cause against which he has
stipulated with the shipper, he shall not
be liable for the same unless it arises
from the want of care of his employees.
Without, therefore, deciding whether or
not the evidence adduced in the case
tends to establish any want of reasonable
or ordinary care on the part of the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, I instruct you that such evidence
is irrelevant and incompetent, and that
you should disregard it, that is, give no
more effect to it than if it had not been
When the case was taken
adduced."
to the Supreme Court of the United
States, a contrary doctrine was announced by that distinguished tribunal.
"With this ruling (that of the court
below)" said ir. Justice STRONG, "€we
are unable to concur. The railroad
company in transporting the messenger
of the defendant and the express matter in his charge was the agent of somebody, either of the express company or
of the shippers or consignees of the
property. That it was the agent of the
defendants is quite clear. It was employed by them and paid by them. The
service it was called upon to perform
was a service for the defendants, a duty
incumbent upon them, and not upon the
plaintiffs. The latter had nothing to do
It was neither
with the employment.
directed by them nor had they any control over the railroad company or its
It is true the defendants
employees.
had also no control over the company
or its servants ; but they were its employers. presumably they paid for its
service and .hat service was directly andControl of the
immediately for them.
conduct of an agency in not in all cases
essential to liability for the consequences
of that conduct. If any one is to be
affected by the acts or omissions of persons employed to do a particular service,

surely it must be he who gave the employment. Their acts become his because done in his service and by his
direction. Moreover, a common carrier
who undertakes for himself to perform
an entire service has no authority to
constitute another person or corporation
the agent of his consignor or consignee.
He may employ a subordinate agency;
but it must be subordinate to him and
not to one who neither employs it nor
pays it, nor has any right to interfere
with it. If, then, the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Company was acting
for these defendants and performing a
service for them, when transporting the
packages they had undertaken to convey,
as we think must be concluded, it would
seem it must be considered their agent.
And why is not the reason of the rule
that common carriers cannot stipulate
for exemption from liability for their
own negligence and that of their servants
and agents, as applicable to the contract
made in these cases as it was to the facts
that appeared in the case of Railroad
Company v. Lockwood? The foundation
of the rule is that it tends to the greater
security of consignors who always deal
with such carriers at a disadvantage.
It tends to induce greater care and
watchfulness in those to whom an owner
intrusts his goods, and by whom alone
the needful care can be exercised. Any
contract that withdraws a motive for
such care or that makes a failure to
bestow upon the duty assumed extreme
vigilance and caution more probable,
takes away the security of the consignors,
and makes common carriers more unreliable. This is equally true whether the
contract be for exemption from liability
for the negligence of agencies employed
by the carrier to assist him in the discharge of his obligations, though he has
no control over them, or whether it be
for exemption from liability for a loss
occasioned by the carelessness of his
immediate servant. Even in the latter
case he may have no actual control.
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Theoretically he has; but inost frequently when the negligence of his servaut occurs, he is not at hand, has no
opportunity to give directions, and the
negligent act is against his will. He is
responsible because he hag put the servant in a place where the wrong could
be done. It is quite as important to the
consignor, and to the public, that the
subordinate agency, though not a servant under immediate control, should be
held to the strictest care, as it is that the
carrier himself and the servants under
his orders should be."
Two cases--one in England the other
here-attempt to stem this tide of authority, the one hesitatingly, the other sturdily: Wright v. Midland Railroad Co.,
Law Rep., 8 Exch. 137; Sprague v.
Smith, 29 Vt. 421. In the English case,
as in Thomas's Case, a railroad company, by statutory authority, ran over a
portion of the defendant's line. At the
point of junction between the two lines,
were signals which were in charge of the
defendant's servants. Tie servants of
the first company having negligently
disobeyed the signals given, one of their
trains collided with one of the defendant's trains, and the plaintiff, a passenger in the latter train was injured. No
negligence being imputed to the defendant's servants, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover. Great Western
Railroad Co. v. Blake and Thomas v.
Rhymney Railroad Co., supra, were "distinguished" by the court, satisfactorily
to it, presumably, if not to others. The
act of the negligent company the court
argued was not negligence which related
to the carrying of the plaintiff; "it was
done while he was being carried it is
true, but it had nothing to do with his
being carried." It was done by the
negligent company for their own purposes, in a matter not connected with
the carrying of the plaintiff. "It was
not a negligent act which made the road
unsafe, nor the carriage or engine unsafe, or the signals wrong, but done

outside of the carrying, and which caused
damage to the plaintiff while he was
being carried." This is certainly a fine
distinction. It would have been better,
and at the same time much easier, had
the court squarely denied the rule that
the carrier is bound to have its means
of transit as safe as the highest vigilance
can insure. If a railroad is not bound
to keep its track clear, then it is not
liable at all for an injury received by a
passenger in a collision; if it is not
bound to see that a third person, who
uses its road with its consent, shall not
be the cause of an injury to a passenger, then this decision is correct. But
both these propositions are negatived
by abundant authority. In Sprague v.
Smith, 29 Vt. 421, the defendants were
trustees operating a road upon which the
plaintiff was a passenger, having an
arrangement with another company to
run their cars over their road. The car
in which plaintiff was riding while on
the track of the other company was carelessly run into by a train of the latter.
The Supreme Court of Vermont held
that the defendants were not liable. The
court, after stating the general rules
governing the liabilities of passenger car
riers, said: "We do not perceive that
this rule of liability could make the carrier of passengers liable for the act of a
party over whom he had no control.
If the act causing the injury were that
of a servant or operative employed upon
the train carrying the plaintiff, although
such operative were furnished and paid
by another company, as the engineer
in the present case, the carrier is undoubtedly liable. So, too, if the injury
is caused by the misconduct of other
servants of the same carrier, who is
carrying the plaintiff while operating
other trains, the carrier is liable. But
he cannot be regarded as liable, we
think, for all the acts of all the operatives of the companies over whose roads
he carries the plaintiff, unless some
connection between the roads of a char

FLAACKE v. MAYOR OF JERSEY CITY.
Shortly, the principles to be deducted
acter similar to that of general partnership or the consolidation of their inter- from the foregoing cases are:
1. A carrier is responsible for injuries
ests in the carrying business is shown,
received by a passenger in the course of
which was not done in the present case."
It may be observed that this ruling has his transportation, which might have
not been cited with approval in any sub- been avoided or guarded against by the
sequent case. It is, as has been seen, exercise on his part of extraordinary
entirely opposed to the authorities cited vigilance, aided by the highest skill.
2. This vigilance and skill is deabove, and is likewise at variance with
the conclusions in the following cases:
manded of him as to all the agencies or
McElroy v. Nashua, 6-c., Railroad Co., means employed by him in the transpor4 Cuslh. 400; furch v. Concord, 6-c.,tation of the passenger.
3. If, in order to perform his engagealadroad Co., 29 N. H. 9; Peters v.
R ylands, 20 Penn. St. 497; Champion ment with the passenger, he is obliged
v. Bostwick-, 11 Wend. 571 ; 18 Wend.
to rely on others, it does not change his
175; Barron v. Illinois, 4-c., Railroad liability that he is not able to direct or
Co., 1 Biss. 453; 5 Wall. 90; Toledo, control them.
4. No contract or agreement between
4-c., Railroad Co. v. Bumbold, 40 Ill.
143; Candee v. Pennsylvania Railroad the contracting carrier and another carCo., 21 Wis. 582; Hart v. Railroad rier, unknown or unassented to by the
Co., 8 N. Y. 37 ; Nedson v. RailroadCo.,
passenger, can oblige the latter to resort
26 Vt. 717; Railroad Co. v. Winans, for his remedy to any other carrier than
17 How. 39; Schopman v. Railroad Co., the one with whom his eontract for car
9 Cush. 25; Weed v. Railroad Co., 19 riage was made.
Wend. 534; Williams v. T'anderbilt, 28
Joni D. LAwsox.
N. Y. 217; Wyman v. Railroad Co., 46
St. Louis.
Me. 162.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
HENRY FLAACKE v. MAYOR OF JERSEY CITY

ET AL.

A solicitor who is a party to a suit and appears in his own behalf, is entitled to
the allowances made by the fee-bill for his services therein, except a retaining fee.
Certain items of costs and their taxation and allowance considered.
MOTION for re-taxation of costs.

S. B. .Ran3om, for the motion.
S. C. Mount, contra.
RuNYoN, Chancellor.-The complainant objects not only to certain items of the bills of costs as taxed for the defendants Andrew
B. Church and S. 0. Mount respectively, on the ground that the
allowances are greater than the law authorizes, but insists that Mr.
Mount, who is a solicitor of this court, and appeared in the cause
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in his own person, is not entitled to any costs, because he did not
appear by solicitor. The objections cannot be sustained. A
solicitor who is a party to a suit and appears in his own person, is
entitled to the allowances made by the fee-bill for his services
therein, except, of course, for a retaining fee. Willard v. Harbeck, 3 Denio 260. * * *

[Here the Chancellor reviewed the items objected to, which
being merely local are omitted.] The clerk performing the solicitor's work, at his request, charges him for it the fees to which the
latter is entitled; and for convenience in keeping accounts between
them, places the charge in the clerk's column instead of the solicitor's. The charge of $1.85 is, if the bill in fact contains three
folios, correct. The objection to the charge for entering appearance
is that fifty-two cents are allowed for it, whereas but twenty cents
should have been allowed. Here, again, the clerk has done the
solicitor's work and charges him the fees to which the latter is
entitled for doing it. The solicitor's fees for drawing the appearance are according to immemorial practice, there being no special
provision for this work in the fee-bill, as there is not for his compensation for drawing a bill of costs, twenty cents. The clerk
was, as the law stood when the appearance was entered, entitled to
twelve cents for filing, and to twenty cents for entering the appearance. There is no error in this item.
These charges by the clerk for solicitor's work at solicitor's rates,
have the sanction of very long-continued practice through the
administration of various clerks, and the propriety thereof seems
not to have been called in question. They are just. If made in
the solicitor's column of the bill of costs there would be no ground
for challenging them, for the solicitor is entitled to make them.
From time immemorial the practice has been, for convenience, to
charge them in the clerk's column. It of course makes no difference to the suitor who is required to pay them, whether they are
charged in the one or the other. If the clerk does such work for
the solicitor at his request, the fee allowed to the latter by the feebill would be the reasonable compensation for it.
The construction of the fee-bill which has been followed in the
taxation of costs for filing the answer and its accompanying affidavits, &c., has existed for very many years and under different
clerks in chancery, and though the attention of the legislature
appears to have been drawn to it in the passage of the act of 1879
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(Pamph. L. of 1879, p. 103), yet it left the construction undisturbed
except in the respects specified, and it s6, by implication, recognised it. By that act it is provided that if upon any paper filed
there be "endorsed any return, affidavit of service or of non-residence or statements of sheriffs on executions, or masters' fees, or
other matter," but one fee for filing such paper with such matter
endorsed thereon shall be allowed. It will be seen that the prohibition (for such, in view of the existence of the practice under
,onsideration, it in effect is) is directed merely to certain endorsements, and it does not extend by its terms (nor by implication) to
affidavits of verification and schedules attached to a bill or answer.
It has reference to returns and matters of a like character, without
regard to the mode in which they are made, whether it be by statement or affidavit.
All the charges excepted to are allowable, except the retaining
fee in Mr. Mount's bill. It does not appear that he employed
counsel, and therefore a retaining fee will not be allowed. As to
the alleged excess in the charges and allowances for the number
of folios in papers, those errors, if they exist, are of course to be
corrected. No costs of this motion will be awarded to eithei
party.
Officers may not detain papers or
records until their fees are paid: Anon.,
Dickinson's Prec. 24; Taylor v. Lewis,
2 Yes. IlI ; Hayne v. Watts, 3 Swanst.
93; Wait v. Schoonmaker, 15 How. Pr.
460 ; Young v. Sutton, 2 V. & B. 365 ;
Rex v. Bury, Doug. 185, note; see
Owen's Case, 2 Ves. 25; Farewell v.
Coker, 2 P. Wins. 460; nor the body
after a habeas corpus: Hopman v. Barber, 2 Str. 814.
A party not a practising attorney or
solicitor cannot be entitled to costs for
practising: French v. Morgan, I Hogan
230; Stewart v. New York, 10 Wend,
597 ; People v. Steuben, 12 Id. 200;
Yerplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 1
Edw. Ch. 46 ; Gillis v. Holly, 19 Ala.
663. In Gordon v. Scott, 2 Bank. Reg.
28, a party serving the subponas on his
own witnesses was held entitled to the
costs therefor. See Anon., Hal. Dig.
240, 8.
Nor one pretending to be an attorney,

but who has never been admitted:
Coates v. Hawkyard, I Russ. & Myl.
746; Willett v. Lord CI~fton, Glassc.
254; Humphreys v. Harvey, 1 Bing.
N. C. 62 ; Jones v. Hayman, Barn. 46 ;
Ames v. Gilman, 10 Mete. 239; Perkins
v. M3cDuffee, 63 Me. 181 ; Tedrick v.
.Miner, 61 Ill. 189; Robb v. Smith, 3
Seam. 46. See Stevens v. Fuller, 55.
N. H. 443.
A solicitor being temporarily uncer.
tificated will not estop him: Jones's
Case, Law Rep., 9. Eq. 63; Prior T.
lfoore, 2 M, & S. 605. See, however,
Sparling v. .Brereton, Law Rep., 2 Eq.
64; Angell's Case, 6 D. & L. 144;
Fullalove v. Parker, 8 Jur. (N. S.)
1078; Young v. Dowlman, 3 You. &
Jer. 24 ; nor affect the rights or liabilities of the parties to the suit, who are
not attorneys: Reader v. Bloom, 10.
Moore 261 ; 3 Bing. 9; Hope's Case,
Law. Rep., 7 Ch. 766.
An admission in another court has
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sometimes been deemed sufficient: Vil1 Jur. 643; Ontario V. Winnaker, 13
kinson v. Diggell, 1 B. & C. 158; Hulls Grant's Ch. 443; Meighen v. Bell, 24
Id. 503; Broughton v. Broughton, 5
v. Lea, 10 Q. B. 940. See Evans v.
De G., M. & G. 160; Morgan v. HanDuncombe, 1 Cr. & Jr. 372; 1ill v.
nas, 49 N. Y. 667 ; but see Stanes v.
Sydney, 7 Ad. & E. 956.
Pirker, 9 Beav. 388, and cases in note;
Attorneys who are partners should all
Harris v. Martin, 9 Ala. 895 ; Morgan
be admitted in the courts in which they
v. Nelson, 43 Id. 585 ; Miumma's Acpractise: Willett v. Clifton, Glasse. 254;
count, 5 ra. L. J. Rep. 424; Scott v.
littson v. Brown, 3 Col. 304. Yet it
State, 2 Md. 284; Clack v. Carton, 7
seems sufficient to recover, that one of
Jur. (N. S.) 441; Hanson v. Baillie,
them has been admitted in the court
where the services were rendered: Ar- 2 Macq. 80; Teague v. Corbitt, 57 Ala.
den v. Tucker, 4 B. & Ad. 815; Har- 529; Welge's Case, I Fed. Rep. 216.
land v. Lilienthal, 53 N. Y. 438;
The rule does not apply when such
Turner v. Reynell, 14 C. B. (N. S.)
costs are not payable out of the trust
328; Meddowcroft v. Holbrooke, 1 W.
funds: Col. Co. v. Cameron, 24 Grant's
BI. 50. See .McGill v. McGill, 2 Met.
Ch. 548.
(Ky.) 258; Klingensmith v. Kepler, 41
The mayor of a city has been held
competent to act as its attorney: Niles
Ind. 341 ; Jones v. Page, 44 Ala. 657.
v. Ifuzzy, 33 Mich. 61.
See Gibson v.
The omission to obtain a license from
the United States does not disqualify Zanesville, 31 Ohio St. 184; Powers v.
an attorney as to costs: Harrington Decatur, 54 Ala. 214; but in Vin. Abr.,
v. Edwards, 17 Wis. 586; nor the Attorney, k, it is said that in an action
by the commonalty of a town, one of
omission of a stamp from his certificate:
the commonalty cannot appear as attorMiddleton v. Chambers, 1 M. &-G. 97.
ney for the commonalty, for he is party
Proceedings against one not an attorto the action ; a statute prohibiting a
ney, if he held himself out to the.plaindirector of a bank to appear as its attiff as such, will not be set aside; Lloyd
torney was deemed constitutional : West
v. Fenton, Hay & Jon. 35.
Feliciana Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 5
In a suit against an attorney, he canHow. (Miss.) 273; so brokers who
not conduct his defence bnt.h in person
and by attorney: Robinson v. Palmer, 2 ,were also attorneys were held not enAllen (N. B.) 223; Aloscati v. Lawson,
titled to charge counsel fees, for services
1 M. & Rob. 454; New Brunswick about the business of their employer in
relation to lands in their hands, as such
Railroad Co. v. Conybeare, 9 H. of L.
Cas. 711; but see Bolan v. Egan, 2
brokers: Walker v. Am. Nat. Bank, 49
N. Y. 659 ; Dyer v. Sutherland, 75 Il1.
Brev. 426; Johns v. Bolton, 12 Penn.
St. 339 ; Branson v. Caruthers, 49 Cal.
583 ; nor can a receiver act as his own
374; Cobbett v. Hudson, 1 El.*& Bl.
counsel, so as to charge the estate for
his services: Bank of Niagara Case,
ILt.
An executor, administrator, guardian
6 Paige 213; 3McGourky v. Downs, MS.,
or trustee, who is also an attorney, canN. J. Chan., May Term 1880 (see
not recover for professional services Adams v. Woods, 8 Cal. 32 1) ; nor can
rendered the estate: 3 Wins. on Ex'rs one member of a partnership who is an
k6th Am. ed,) 1854, y, &c., 1861, m;
attorney charge the others for profesWillard v. Bassett, 27 Ill. 37 ; Key's
sional services about the firm's affairs,
Estate, 5 La. Ann. 567 ; Allen v. Jar- either before or after dissolution: Jivis, Law Rep., 4 Ch. 616 ; Spinks v.
burn v. Codd, 7 B. & C. 419; Van
Davis, 32 Miss. 152; Christophers v.
Duzer v. .McMillan, 37 Ga. 299; McWhite, 10 Beav. 523; Moore v. Frowd, Crary v, Ruddick, 33 Iowa 521; nor
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can an attorney who is a mortgagee recover his costs on his own foreclosure:
Sclater v. Cottam, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 630;
Patterson v. Donner, 48 Cal. 369; nor
can a solicitor who has an interest in
attending to a cause, charge for his services, without an express agreement;
Martin v. Campbell, 11 Rich. Eq. 205
(see Deere v. Robiason, 7 Hare 283) ;
but he would be liable for costs: Voorhees v. McCartney, 51 N. Y. 387; Cone
v. Donaldson, 47 Penn. St. 363 ; a director of a corporation who brought
suit as an attorney against such corporation, was held entitled to costs: Christie v. Sawyer, 44 N. H. 298; as to a
stockholder sustaining such relation, see
Spence v. Whitaker, 3 Fort. 297.
An attorney can recover ordinary witness fees when he offers himself as a
witness in his own case : Leaver v.
Whalley, 2 Dowl. 80: Taaks v. Schmidt,
25 How. Pr. 340; or is called in
another's case during his regular attendance at that term; Parks v. Brewer, 14
Pick. 192; Marshall v. Parsons, 4 Jur.
1017 ; Abbott v. Johnson, 47 Wis. 239 ;
but fees when so in attendance were
refused in McWilliams v. Hopkins, 1
Whart. 276 ; Crummer v. Huff, 1 Wend.
25; Jon&; v. Botsford, 1 Pug. & Bur.
581 ; see Reynolds v. Walker, 7 Hill.
144.
Where the cause was conducted by
one member of a firm of attorneys, the
fees of another member called as a witncss were allowed; Butler v. Hobson, 5
Bing. N. 0. 128, 1 Arn. 424.
Quere, whether an attorney who calls
himself as a witness can recover his fees,
when the law does not allow other parties calling themselves to do so; Grinnell
v. Dennison, 12 Wis. 402; Hale v. 3Merrill, 27 Vt. 738; Nichols v. Brunswick,;
3 Cliff. 88; Parker v. Mlartin, 3 Pitts.
166; Grub v. Simpson, 6 Heisk. 92;
Delcomyn v. Chamberlin, 48 How. Pr.
409; Stratton v. Upton, 36 N. H. 581;
see Howes v. Barber, 18 Q. B. 588.
It seems a co-defendant who attended
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solely as a witness may recover; Barry
v. McGrade, 14 Minn. 286 ; so if the
plaintiff call the defendant; Harvey v.
Tebbutt, 1 J. & W. 197 ; Goodwin v.
Smith, 68 Ind. 301 ; Leeds v. Amherst,
14 Sim. 357 ; Young v. English, 7 Bear.
10; see Hutchins v. Hutchins, Ir. Law
Rep., 10 Eq. 453. If an attorney refuse
obedience to a subpcena he can be punished for contempt as a witness only, and
cannot be deprived of his office as attorney; Com. v. Newman, 2 Phila. 262.
If an attorney bears any other relation to the subject-matter of the suit, e. g.
as an agent, auctioneer, &c., the court
will not exercise summary jurisdiction
over him: Coclcs v. Harman, 6 East
404; Grubb's Case, 5 Taunt. 206;
Edwards v. Hodding, Id. 815; Toms 4M1oore's Case, 3 Ch. Chain. 41 ; see
Didson v. WiLkinson, 4 De G. & J.
508; Carroll's case, 2 Ch. Chain. 323;
Allen v. AIdridge, 5 Beav. 401 ; Rawes
v. Rawes, 7 Sim. 624; Weeks on Attorneys, H 77, 94; Smith v. McLendon, 59
Ga. 523; Pennock v. Fuller, 41 Mich.
153; 17 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 759 and
note.
An attorney who is a party to a suit
is entitled to recover his costs ; Gugy v.
Brown, Law Rep., I P. C. 411, reversing s. c. 11 Low. Can. 409 ; Jervis v.
Dewes, 4 Dowl. P. C. 764.
le can recover nothing for loss of
time; Pritchard v. Walker, 3 C. & P.
212; Collins v. Godefroy, I B. & Ad.
959; see Corley v. Afoore, Glassc. 336;
Severn v. Olive, 3 Irish Law Rec. 193.
He is not obliged to pay for a plea
where he himself is plaintiff; Anon.,
Sayer 77.
The institution of county courts does
not destroy an attorney's privilege as to
suing and being sued in his own court,
and subject him to costs for not recovering more than the amount recoverable in
the inferior court; Lewis v. Hance, 5
D. & L. 641 ; 11 Q. B. 921 ; Jeffreys v
Beart, Id. 646; Jones v. Brown, 2
Exch. 329; Johnson v. Bray, 2 B. & B.
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698 ;
655;
Cas.
450;

Borradaile v. NeZson, 14 C. B.
but see Bailey's Case, I Johns.
32 ; Varian v. Ogilvie, 3 Johns.
Boulton v. Hubbard, 6 Id. 332;

Walsh v. Sackrider, 7 Id. 537; Foster
v. Garnsey, 13 Id. 465; Wood v. (Gibson, 1 Cow. 597; Draper v. Beasley, 8
U. C. Q. B. 260.
JOHN H. STEWaRT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
FRANK F. COOK v.LUCIUS M. JOHNSON.
as
The plaintiff for a sufficient consideration bought of the defendant his business
within a
a dentist, and the latter executed a contract not to practice dentistry "
terriradius of ten miles of Litchfield." The town of Litchfield has an extensive
which the
tory and an irregular outline, and contains the village of Litchfield, in
was drawn
defendant dwelt and had his office at the time, and where the contract
ten miles of the
and executed. Held, that the above expression meant "within
centre of the village of Litchfield."
which the
And held, that the contract was not void in not fixing a period within
limits.
those
within
dentistry
practise
to
not
defendant was
circumIt seems that where such a contract is reasonable when made, subsequent
its operation.
stances, such as the covenautee's ceasing to do business, do not affect

PETITION for an injunction against the practise of dentistry by
trial
the respondent. Decree for petitioner and motion for a new
by the respondent.
H. B. Graves, in support of the motion.
C. B. Andrews and E. B. Kellogg, contra.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Loomis, J.-The questions presented by the respondent's motion

of the
for a new trial depend on the validity and construction
following contract:

"Litchfield, Connecticut, April 2d 1874.
I this day sell and convey, to Frank F. Cook, all the furniture
my
and fixtures in the rooms over Dr. Beckwith's drug store; also
dentistry
practise
to
not
myself
good-will; and do agree and bind
within a radius of ten miles of said Litchfield. And for the condollars
sideration above named have this day received one hundred
from Frank F. Cook's hand.
L. M. JOHNSON."
As this belongs to the class of contracts in restraint of trade,

three requisites are essential to its validity.

1st. It must be
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partial, or restricted in its operation in respect either to time or
place. 2d. It must be on some good consideration. 3d. It must
be reasonable, that is, it should afford only a fair protection to the
interests of the party in whose favor it is made, and must not be
so large in its operation as to interfere with the interests of the
public.
The motion does not disclose that it was claimed in the court
below that the contract was lacking in any of these elements, but
only that it was too indefinite and uncertain in its language to be
enforced. The respondent admits the making of the contract, and
full performance on the part of the petitioner, but concedes that he
has paid no attention to it whatever, except to keep the money
paid under it. This is not very creditable, to say the least, and
the excuse given does not at all relieve him in a moral point of
view. He says, in effect, that inasmuch as he did not understand,
by the language which he used in the contract, where the circle
with its ten-mile radius would be drawn, he will locate within the
town of Litchfield, where he can do the other party the most
injury, and appropriate to himself the good-will of the business he
had sold, knowing absolutely such conduct to be contrary even to
his own understanding of the contract. Such a position might
well excuse a court of equity from giving any construction to the
contract merely for his future guidance.
But he says that he stands simply on his legal rights, and he
insists that the contract by the rules of law is too uncertain and
indefinite, both as to territory and time, to be binding. This
question is involved in the motion for a new trial, and calls for a
decision; and with a view to prevent future litigation between the
parties, we will discuss it briefly.
The counsel for the respondent ask in their brief, " How can the
court determine, under this contract, the territory from which the
respondent is excluded from practising dentistry by the provision
'within a radius of ten miles from Litehfield.?' At what point is
the radius to be taken? From the centre of the town of Litchfield? Or is it to be taken from .the extreme boundaries of the
town " The construction suggested by the last interrogatory is
manifestly unnatural and unreasonable. The large extent and
irregularity of the boundary lines of the town, would extend the
prohibited territory much further from the respondent's former
place of business at certain points than at others, without any

COOK v. JOHNSON.

reason for it founded on the extent of the good-will of the business
in reference to which it is to be presumed the limits were prescribed. And besides, the term "radius," which means "a right
line drawn or extending from the centre of a circle to its periphery"
is wholly inapplicable to such a construction.
But in making such a contract the parties would naturally take
their stand at tfie place where the business to be sold had been
carried on, and would fix the utmost limits of the territory at equal
distance from that point in every direction, and as far at least as
they supposed the good-will might attract customers. Now the
contract is dated at "Litchfield," where the post-office of that name
was located, and the ten miles are to be computed from "said
Litchfield," referring to the place where it was dated. It is also to
be remarked that the precise point in the village of Litchfield,
where the business referred to had been carried on by the
respondent, is mentioned, namely, "in the rooms over Dr. Beckwith's drug store."
Now if we put ourselves in the position of the parties it would
seem That the language which they used is capable of very easy
and definite application, and thus construed the contract means ten
miles in every direction from the centre of the village of Litchfield.
The only remaining inquiry is, whether any more definite
limitation, as to time, is required.
The contract is silent in respect to the time of its duration.
But there is a well-settled distinction between a general restriction
as to place and a general restriction as to time. The mere fact
that the duration of the restriction as to time is indefinite or perpetual; will not of itself avoid the contract if it is limited as to
place, and is reasonable and proper in all other respects: Hitchcock
v. Coker, 6 Ad. & E. 447; Bun v. Guy, 4 East 190; Chesman
v. Nainby, 2 Strange 739; s. c. 2 Ld. Raym. 1456; Wilkins v.
-Evans, 3 You. & Jer. 318; Mallen v. May, 11 Mees. & Wels.
652: Hastings v. 'Whitley, 2 Exch. 611; Story on Sales, 1st ed.,
sect 493; Pierce v. Woodward, 6 Pick. 206; Bowser v. Bliss,
7 Blackf. 344.
It is said that the petitioner may cease to practise dentistry, and
that in such case the respondent ought not to remain under a perpetual injunction. The court, in its discretion, might in the decree
have anticipated such a contingency and provided for it, but the
decree is not invalid on account of such omission, any more than
the contract is
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The rule as to the contract is, that if it is reasonable when made,
subsequent circumstances, such as the fact of the covenantee ceasing
business, so as no longer to need the protection, do not affect its
operation : -Elves v. Orofts, 10 C. B. 241.
A new trial is not advised.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
ORMSBY v. THE CITY OF LOUISVILLE.
Sunday not being a judicial day the publication of a city ordinance upon that
day is not a valid compliance with the law requiring publication.
But where a publication is required by law for a certain period, as e. g. thirty
days, the intervening Sundays will be counted in the enumeration, although no publication be made on them.
Where the charter of a city requires that "all ordinances shall be published" in
'
a specified manner " before they are enforced, " such publication is a condition precedent to the legal enforcement of an ordinance.
In pleading at common law the facts must be given showing compliance with a
condition precedent, 6r excusing its performance; a general averment of compliance,
is only an averment of a legal conclusion and therefore insufficient.
Interest is not allowable upon taxeg by way of damages, and if any penalty or
percentage is allowed by law, the party claiming it should show affirmatively a compliance with all the requirements of the law.
A description of property upon a tax-list need not be as full or precise as in a
deed; it is sufficient if a person of ordinary capacity may understand what is meant
by it.

from the Louisville Chancery Court. Bill by the city
of Louisville, under Act of March 3d 1876, to assert and enforce
a lien for municipal taxes.
APPEAL

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARGIS, J.-The charter and its amendments of the city of Louisville provide that all ordinances "1shall be published" once in at
least two papers of the largest circulation, "before they are
enforced." The annual levy ordinances for taxation are required
to be adopted by the city council before taxes can be legally collected: .Bbone v. Gleason, decided in this court in 1878, not yet
reported. And we think the charter and amendments above
referred to, make the publication of such ordinances a necessary
pre-requisite to their enforcement.

We have carefully investigated the authorities cited on all the.
questions presented for our consideration, and without referring to
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all of them specifically, we will give the conclusions at which we
have arrived, citing only such as we deem necessary to a correct
understanding of this opinion.
The appellants demurred to the petition generally, their demurrer
was overruled and they excepted.
The petition makes no reference to the publication of the annual
ordinances, but after the demurrer to it was overruled the appellee
filed a reply, in which it is alleged that " the plaintiff says that
up in
each one of the seven ordinances (i. e. levy ordinances) set
in
were
taxes,
concerning
ordinance
an
the petition, each entitled
law."
by
all respects published as required
This mode of pleading a condition precedent in a contract was
authorized by sect. 149 of the Civil Code of 1851, but that section
was omitted from the Civil Code of 1877, and thereby the rules of
pleading as they existed before the Civil Code of 1851 .insuch
cases were revived and the common-law rule restored.
A statement of the facts showing how and when a condition precedent was performed, or giving an excuse for its non-performance,
was ordinarily required at common law. Averbeck v. Hall, 14
Bush 508, and authorities cited; Newman's Practice, p. 333.
The averment in the reply did not help the petition, because to
allege that the ordinances were in all respects published as required
by law is a legal conclusion.
The facts in regard to the publication should have been alleged,
showing when and how the publication was made, and in what
character of newspapers.
The court erred in overruling the demurrer to the petition.
As the plaintiff should be allowed to amend on the return of the
cause, it becomes necessary to decide several other questions raised
upon the record, which we proceed to do.
1. A publication of the levy ordinances on Sunday, and on no
other day, before seeking to enforce them, is not such a publication
as the charter requires or the law of this state approves.
It is not a judicial day, nor is it a day upon which any work,
labor or calling can be legally pursued unless of necessity or charity. Legal process cannot ordinarily be legally served upon Sunday, and there is no reason shown why the publication of an
ordinance of the city of Louisville on Sunday should be held as a
compliance with its charter requiring publication of such ordiis
nances. The publication is a violation of law, and no citizen
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bound, by any law known to us, to read secular newspapers on Sunday to entitle himself to the benefits which may flow from publications contained in them. If he chooses, he may refuse to read
them on Sunday altogether, and none of his legal rights will be
thereby forfeited.
Before the contents of the newspapers, the 0orier-Journal
and Anzeiger, could be lawfully proven, their absence should have
been accounted for, either by proving their loss or the inability of
the plaintiff, after a bona fide legal effort, to obtain possession or
access to them. This is not a question of the existence of those
papers, but as to their contents, and the best evidence of that fact,
of which it is susceptible, should be adduced, and that evidence is
furnished by the papers themselves.
The levy ordinance for the year 1873, approved May 28th,
gave the assessor until June 10th to furnish to the city receiver
the tax bills, and the ordinance for the year 1874 gave him until
July 1st to perform that duty. By ordinance No. 482, all tax
bills shall be due and payable on the first day of June of each
year, and shall be listed in proper time with the receiver for
collection. Ordinance No. 488 provided that notice should be
published, in at least three newspapers, of the time at which taxes
are due, and the place where the same will be received. And
unless the notices by publication, required by sections one and two
of ordinance No. 488, are made at the time and in the manner
therein directed, no percentage shall be charged: Lucas's Digest
264, 265. There is no allegation in the petition or pleadings
showing that such publication was made, and as the percentage is
a penalty, it cannot be recovered in this action. And it ought
never to be allowed unless the law has been completely complied
with by the city. Interest is not allowable upon taxes by way of
damages.
Section two of an Act approved February 17th 1866, requires
that the board of commissioners of taxes and assessments shall
cause public notice to be given in two or more daily newspapers in
said city, for a space of not less than thirty days, that the assessment rolls of all persons assessed for taxation in said city are then
open for examination and correction.
The fact that such notice was published, in the manner required
by said section, should have been alleged and proved. But in
counting the thirty days Sundays will not be thrown out. The
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statute does not mean thirty secular days. It is like the service
of a summons which is required to be served ten or twenty days
before the beginning of the term; such service will be in time,
although some of the days should be Sunday, provided the service
shall not be made on Sunday. This is very different from publishing the notice on Sunday. If th3 notice be published thirty days,
pro. Ied the first publication is not on Sunday, which is requisite
to make the thirty days, it is sufficient, although the publication is
not made upon the intervening Sundays, which ought not to be
done.
As to the description of the lots sought to be taxed, it is not as
full as it might have been, but from the nature of his duties the
assessor could not, without great delay and embarrassment, give
such a description of the property as is required in a deed or judgment. It would be unreasonable to require him to do so, and it
tends greatly to prevent the collection of taxes. A simple tax roll,
laid off into proper columns for the names of the owners, a brief
description of the property, the valuation, with appropriate headings, so that a person of ordinary understanding may understand
what is meant, and the property found on which the assessment is
made, is all that is required by any state in the Union.
The number of feet front and the depth of the lots, with the
name of the street and the side of the street on which they are
located, also the names of the streets between which they are
situated, are given, and we think the description sufficient.
The valuation is set down on the roll in perpendicular columns,
neaded " value per foot," "value of ground," "value of improvements" and "total value." The value at which the lots in question
was assessed is placed under those heads on parallel lines running
from left to right of the roll, opposite the names of the appellants
and the description of the property, in Arabic numerals. There is
no mark or sign accompanying the figures, indicating that they
stand for dollars, other than the writing at the head of the perpepdicular columns, as stated above. We think those headings show
that the figures stand for value of the property opposite which they
are placed.
There is no decimal mark or sign separating the figures in any
of the columns except the one headed "total value." And in that
a line separates two figures from the left, leaving three on the
right, showing that cents were not meant by those three figures, aq

